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Abstract The advancements in ICT allow people to use and access resources and services
on the Web anywhere and anytime. Servers offering resources typically require users to
release information about them, which is then used to enforce possible access policies
on the offered services. Effective access to such resources requires the development of
approaches for enabling the user to organize and manage all her credentials and regulate
their release when interacting with other parties over the Web.
In this paper, we provide a means for the user to specify how much she values the
release of different properties, credentials, or combinations thereof as well as additional
constraints that she might impose on information disclosure. Exploiting a graph modeling
of the problem, the user can determine the credentials and properties to disclose to satisfy
a server request while minimizing the sensitivity of the information disclosed. We develop
a heuristic approach that shows execution times compatible with the requirements of
interactive access to Web resources.
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1 Introduction
The development in the past years of the Internet and
associated Web technology has produced a large impact
on society. Still, both technology experts and final users
perceive crucial open problems in the area of security and
privacy. A specific goal receiving considerable attention
is the design of a Web infrastructure offering protection
against adversaries interested in improperly acquiring
user access privileges. At the same time, users want to
easily access all the resources available to them, without
the need to remember passwords or manage a specific ac-
count for each of the systems they access. Cryptographic
credentials offer a great potential for the satisfaction of
the above requirements. Using credentials it is possible
to verify that the counterpart on the other side of the In-
ternet communication channel exhibits given properties,
proved in a robust way using a simple challenge/response
interaction. Today, the most significant use of credentials
is represented by X.509 certificates exhibited by servers
to prove that they are the legitimate owners of a given
domain.
The use of credentials to regulate interactions in open
systems has received considerable attention in the last
ten years. A large number of approaches (e.g., [5, 12, 22])
have been developed proposing novel policy languages
and engines to specify and enforce access control regula-
tions in the presence of requests coming from clients not
known a priori and to communicate them the require-
ments they need to satisfy. Most proposals have typically
focused on the server side of the problem of supporting
interactions, typically assuming that at the client side a
symmetric approach could be applied for specifying pos-
sible regulations on the release of information stored in
a client portfolio.
The support for client-side solutions to regulate cre-
dential release is crucial for a wide-scale deployment of
credentials. However, access control-like specifications do
not completely fit the possible protection requirements
at the client side, where users may need a way to specify
preferences on the information to disclose based on the
sensitivity [8, 11, 20] and domain of such information. In
this paper, we respond to this need and propose an ap-
proach for empowering the user with the ability to spec-
ify privacy preferences on her private information. Our
organization of the client portfolio accommodates emerg-
ing credential technologies (e.g., anonymous credentials),
supporting selective release of properties within certifi-
cates. Our model allows a user to assign sensitivity labels
and context restrictions (expressing both the domain and
the transactions for which they can be used) to proper-
ties, credentials, or combinations thereof in her portfolio.
Basically, sensitivity labels provide a quantitative esti-
mation of the privacy value of the different elements of
the portfolio, as perceived by the user. Expressing sen-
sitivity labels, our approach allows for minimizing infor-
mation release. Context restrictions limit the disclosure
of properties and credentials within a set of interactions.
We characterize the disclosure of information in a port-
folio in terms of a graphical modeling and represent the
problem of determining a disclosure satisfying the re-
quest while minimizing information as the problem of
determining a minimum isomorphic graph matching. Fi-
nally, we describe our heuristics, exploiting the graphical
representation of the model components, for computing
a solution to the problem and present experimental re-
sults that confirm that the approach is applicable to in-
teractive scenarios. In [2] we presented an early version
of our proposal that here has been extended to possi-
bly consider dependencies among properties and creden-
tials that reduce the sensitivity label of combinations of
portfolio elements, and disclosure constraints represent-
ing sets of properties and credentials whose disclosure
should be prohibited. Also, the model has been enriched
with the definition of context restrictions complement-
ing sensitivity labels, which allow the user to restrict the
release of information to those elements in the portfo-
lio considered relevant for a given interaction. The graph
modeling of the portfolio and of a disclosure has been re-
fined to include both context restrictions and disclosure
constraints. We further extended our solution enabling
the client to consider previous releases within a generic
time window in the computation of a minimal disclo-
sure. Finally, the heuristic algorithm originally proposed
in [2], which determines a minimal satisfying disclosure
for a given request, has been changed to consider context
restrictions and disclosure constraints.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 introduces basic concepts related to the mod-
eling of the client portfolio, which also includes emerging
paradigms for producing and presenting credentials. Sec-
tion 3 illustrates a graph-based modeling of the client
portfolio. Section 4 defines server requests and its graph-
based modeling. Sections 5 and 6 illustrate how users
can specify privacy preferences and additional require-
ments on the different elements of their portfolio. Sec-
tion 7 extends the graph modeling of the portfolio to
include the concepts described in Sections 5 and 6. Sec-
tion 8 characterizes the disclosure of information in a
portfolio in terms of our graph-based model. Also, the
problem of determining a disclosure satisfying a server
request while minimizing the sensitivity of released infor-
mation has been modeled as the problem of determining
a minimum isomorphic graph matching. Section 9 dis-
cusses how our solution can accommodate communica-
tions characterized by a sequence of requests by a server.
Section 10 describes our heuristic algorithm for comput-
ing a minimal disclosure satisfying a given request and
presents experimental results proving its efficiency and
effectiveness. Section 11 discusses related work. Finally,
Section 12 presents our conclusions.
2 Basic concepts
The information that a client can provide to acquire ser-
vices forms a portfolio that includes properties in cer-
tificates, signed by third parties, as well as (uncertified)
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Figure 1 An example of hierarchy of credential types
properties that the client can utter. Like in the litera-
ture [5], we refer to certificates as credentials and to un-
certified information as declarations. Credentials are or-
ganized by type, where the type of a credential identifies
the properties that the credential certifies. Abstractions
can be defined over the credential types, possibly intro-
ducing a hierarchy of types. Formally, a hierarchy HT of
credential types is a pair (T ,!T ), where T is the set of
all types, and !T is a partial order relationship over T .
Given two types t i and tj in T , t i!T tj if t i is an abstrac-
tion of tj . For instance, id is an abstraction of credential
types id card , tax id , and passport (i.e., id!T id card ,
id!T tax id , and id!T passport). Figure 1 illustrates an
example of hierarchy of credential types. Each credential
is then characterized by its type, unique identifier, and
issuer.
Our modeling of the portfolio includes all the con-
cepts described above, and distinguishes types from in-
stances, and credentials from declarations.
• Credential types vs instances. Our model allows re-
ferring to credentials at the granularity of instance
or type. For instance, while a client can refer to
credential types or their specific instances, which it
knows (e.g., a specific identity card), the requests
by the server will typically be expressed in terms
of credential types (e.g., id card or id). Note that a
portfolio may contain different credential instances
of the same type. Also, while directly belonging to
a single type, a credential indirectly belongs to all
the abstractions of such a type.
• Credentials vs declarations. We explicitly model
declarations allowing the inclusion in the client
portfolio of properties that do not belong to any
credential. In addition, we assume that any prop-
erty appearing in credentials can be uttered in an
uncertified way by the client, and therefore can be
stated as a declaration. In our modeling, we conve-
niently represent declarations as a self-signed cre-
dential of type declaration, whose identifier is decl ,
containing all the properties of the portfolio.
3 Client portfolio
We enrich the client portfolio with novel concepts, en-
abling the client to organize and manage its portfolio at
a fine-grain level for regulating disclosure of credentials
and properties.
• Credential-dependent vs credential-independent
properties. Credentials certify some properties
of the client. We distinguish between properties
associated uniquely with the client, regardless
of the credentials that certify them (credential-
independent properties), and properties associated
with a specific credential of the client (credential-
dependent properties). For instance, date of birth
is a property of the user, and possible occurrences
of the property in different credentials refer all
to the same piece of information. In other words,
the value of credential-independent properties de-
pends only on the credential’s owner, and not
on the specific credential certifying the value. By
contrast, a property such as credit card number
is specific of some given credentials of the user.
Different instances of the credit card credential
type (cc) will all refer to their specific credit card
number, and therefore to a different piece of in-
formation. Credential-dependent properties might
have different occurrences, one for each credential
including them.
• Atomic vs non-atomic credentials. X.509 is today
the most common kind of credentials used in dis-
tributed systems. One of the limitations of X.509
certificates is their rigidity: the signature is com-
puted on the hash of the content of the credential,
and the use of the credential requires to access its
complete representation. In other words, it is not
possible to selectively disclose only a portion of
the credential content. Instead, modern credential
technology (e.g., UProve and Idemix [6, 7]) sup-
ports the release of individual properties extracted
from the credential. Our model includes this aspect
of modern credential technology and classifies cre-
dentials as atomic or non-atomic. Atomic creden-
tials can only be released as a whole, that is, their
release entails the disclosure of all the properties
they certify. Properties in non-atomic credentials
can instead be selectively released. The self-signed
credential decl is clearly non-atomic.
• Information sensitivity . Previous works have put
forward the idea of a preference relationship among
credentials/properties defining that release of some
information is to be preferred over release of other
information. We provide a way for the user to spec-
ify the sensitivity of her properties, credentials, and
associations among them, to the aim of minimizing
the ‘amount’ of information released for acquiring
a service. We discuss portfolio sensitivity in Sec-
tion 5.
• Context restrictions. Information in the client
portfolio is naturally characterized by a domain
(e.g., medical, financial). Each interaction between
a client and a server is characterized by a con-
text, representing the domain of the server and the
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transaction. A user may want to restrict the re-
lease of credentials and properties in her portfolio
based on the server domain and on the transac-
tion they are performing. As an example, the credit
card should only be released to financial servers
when the user is paying for a service or a product.
We provide a way for the user to specify for each
credential, property, or combination thereof the set
of domains and transactions where they can be re-
leased. We discuss context restrictions in Section 6.
We model the client portfolio as a portfolio graph,
defined as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Portfolio Graph) Let C and P be a
set of credentials and properties, respectively, in a client
portfolio. The portfolio graph G(VC∪VP ,EC) is a bipar-
tite graph having a vertex for each credential in C and
each property in P, and an edge connecting each creden-
tial to the properties contained in it.
The label of a vertex representing a property is of the
form p :value, where p is the property name and value
its value. The label of a vertex representing a credential
is of the form c :type, where c is the credential identifier
and type its type. For simplicity, in the following, we will
use c (p , resp.) to refer to either the credential (property,
resp.) or the label c :type (p :value, resp.) of the corre-
sponding vertex. We will also denote with type(c) the
type of credential c . Note that, in the portfolio graph,
each credential-independent property is represented by
one vertex (connected to all credentials where it is con-
tained). Each credential-dependent property is instead
represented with several vertices, one for each credential
where it appears, that is, one for each of its instantia-
tions.
In the graphical representation, credential vertices are
rectangles and property vertices are ovals. Also, we dis-
tinguish atomic from non-atomic credentials by attach-
ing all the edges incident to an atomic credential to a
black semicircle.
Example 3.1 Figure 2 illustrates an example of a port-
folio graph, including credentials myId (of type id card),
myTaxId (of type tax id), myPassport (of type pass-
port), myDialysis (of type med record), and myVISA
and myAMEX (both of type cc). Credentials myPass-
port and myDialysis are the only non-atomic creden-
tials in the portfolio. Properties Name, DoB, SSN, Coun-
try, BloodType, Phone, and NickName are credential-
independent, while CCNum is credential-dependent (having
a different occurrence for each credit card).
4 Server request
The request of the server is modeled as a boolean formula
R, which describes the set of properties (and the way
in which they should be certified) that the client needs
Figure 2 An example of portfolio graph
to disclose to acquire a given service. For simplicity and
without loss of generality, we assume the server request
R to be expressed as the disjunction of simple requests,
that is, R=r1 ∨ . . . ∨ r i. Each simple request r is a con-
junction of terms of the form type.{p1,. . . ,pm}, where
each term prescribes the disclosure of the set {p1,. . . ,pm}
of properties from a single credential c in the client port-
folio, such that type!T type(c) (i.e., the type of credential
c is a specialization of the type in the request). Different
terms must be certified by different credentials.
Example 4.1 A request R = r1 ∨ r2, with
r1=
(
id.{Name,Country} ∧ cc.{Name,CCNum} ∧
∗.{Phone}) and r2 = (id.{Name,Country} ∧
cc.{Name,CCNum} ∧ cc.{Name,CCNum}) can be satisfied
in two different ways. The first possibility discloses: i)
properties Name and Country from a credential of type
id; ii) a credit card; and iii) property Phone from any
credential. The second possibility discloses: i) proper-
ties Name and Country from a credential of type id; and
ii) properties Name and CCNum from two different credit
cards.
A request R can be graphically represented as a set
of request graphs. Each request graph models a simple
request r , where, for each term type.{p1,. . . ,pm}, there
is a vertex with label type, a vertex for each property,
whose label is the property name, and an edge connecting
vertex type with the vertices representing p1,. . . ,pm. A
request graph is formally defined as follows.
Definition 4.1 (Request Graph) Let r be a sim-
ple request in a request R. The request graph
Gr (V rT∪V rP ,E rT ) of r is a bipartite graph having a ver-
tex for each term and each property in it, and an edge
connecting each term to the corresponding properties.
In the following, when clear from the context, we will
call request either a request R or a simple request r in
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Figure 3 An example of request graphs
R. Figure 3 illustrates the request graphs for requests r1
and r2 described in Example 4.1.
5 Portfolio sensitivity
The motivation of our work is to provide the client with
an intuitive and easily manageable approach for regulat-
ing the disclosure of her portfolio. As a matter of fact,
when the server offers choices on the properties or cre-
dentials to be provided, the client may prefer to disclose
some over others. For instance, a user may prefer to re-
lease her email over her address and either of the two
instead of her phone number. Intuitively and naturally,
users perceive a value associated with their information
that reflects the sensitivity of this information. Differ-
ent properties and different credentials enjoy therefore
different values in this respect.
5.1 Sensitivity labels
We express information privacy preferences as sensitiv-
ity labels that the user can associate with the different
elements (or combinations thereof) in her portfolio and
reflect how much the user values their disclosure.
In principle the set of sensitivity labels could be any
set of values, provided the existence of a (partial) or-
der relationship over them and a composition operator ⊕
that determines the label resulting from the combination
of two labels. It is easy to see that our generic definition
of sensitivity labels permits to capture different ways of
expressing preferences, including the kinds of preferences
put forward in other works, as a very specific case. For
instance, sensitivity labels could be classical multilevel
security classifications (e.g., Top Secret, Secret, Confi-
dential, Unclassified) with the ⊕ operator corresponding
to the least upper bound . Also, they could be positive in-
teger values, where the ⊕ operator can be either the sum
(i.e., λi ⊕ λj = λi + λj) and therefore reflect an additive
property , or the maximum (i.e., λi ⊕ λj=max (λi,λj)).
These examples are just two specific instantiations of
sensitivity labels, and our modeling accommodates a va-
riety of ways in which preferences over the credentials
and properties to release can be specified and composed.
In this paper, we assume the set of labels to be the set Z
of (positive and negative) integer values, the dominance
relationship to be the ≥ total order relationship, and the
composition operator ⊕ to be the sum + of values.
We now illustrate how the user can specify the sen-
sitivity of the elements of her portfolio via a labeling
function λ : 2C∪P → Z, associating a sensitivity label
with individual elements (properties or credentials) as
well as combinations of them. Also, we model further
constraints that the user might want to specify on the
disclosure of information in her portfolio.
5.2 Sensitivity of properties and credentials
The first step for the user to specify how much she values
information in her portfolio is to associate a sensitivity
label with each property p and credential c .
• λ(p): defines the sensitivity of property p individ-
ually taken. It reflects how much the user consid-
ers the property sensitive and therefore how much
she values its release. The more sensitive the infor-
mation, the greater the sensitivity value associated
with it. For instance, if property SSN is considered
more sensitive than Name, then λ(SSN) > λ(Name).
• λ(c): defines the sensitivity of the existence of
a credential. This is the additional information
carried by the credential itself, regardless of the
information contained in it. For instance, con-
sider a dialysis certificate including properties SSN,
BloodType, and Phone. The certificate sensitivity
is greater than the composition of the labels of the
properties in it. In fact, the existence of the cer-
tificate itself has a sensitivity that goes beyond its
properties. Note that, for non-atomic credentials,
λ(c) reflects the sensitivity assigned to the exis-
tence of the credential regardless of the release of
the properties within it.
5.3 Sensitivity of associations
The release of a set of elements entails a sensitivity cor-
responding to the combination of the sensitivity of all
the elements involved. There are however cases where
releasing together some elements might produce an infor-
mation release whose sensitivity does not precisely cor-
respond to the composition of the labels of the individ-
ual elements. In such cases, we allow the user to specify
an additional (positive or negative) sensitivity label that
should be considered in computing the sensitivity of the
set of elements jointly released. Let A be any set of prop-
erties and/or credentials. The user can specify λ(A) as
the additional , positive or negative, sensitivity to take
into account in computing the sensitivity label of an as-
sociation among the portfolio elements in A, with the
following semantics.
• Sensitive views (λ(A) > 0). They reflect the fact
that a set of portfolio elements jointly released car-
ries more information than the composition (i.e.,
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the sum) of the labels of the individual elements.
For instance, the association between the Name of
a user and her certificate myDialysis can be con-
sidered more sensitive than the composition of the
sensitivity labels of the two. In fact, not only it
discloses the user name and the existence of a dial-
ysis certificate, but also the fact that they are in
association (i.e., the name of the user suffering
from dialysis problems). λ({Name,myDialysis}) ex-
presses the additional sensitivity of the information
when joined.
• Dependencies (λ(A) < 0). They reflect the fact
that a set of portfolio elements jointly released car-
ries less information than the composition (i.e., the
sum) of the labels of the individual elements. For
instance, the association between Phone and Coun-
try can be considered less sensitive than the sum of
the sensitivity labels of the two. As a matter of fact,
the information carried by the phone number per-
mits to determine the country where the user lives.
Hence, releasing the phone number together with
the country does not release additional informa-
tion. λ({Phone, Country}) expresses the sensitivity
to be removed when the two properties are joined.
In this specific example, there is essentially a func-
tional dependency between the two elements and
therefore λ({Phone, Country}) = −λ(Country). In
general, λ(A) can take any negative value, provided
that its absolute value be at most equal to the sen-
sitivity label of the most sensitive element in A.
Formally, |λ(A)|≤max{λ(el):el∈A}.
We note that the user could explicitly define the sen-
sitivity label of an association (specifying the addi-
tional sensitivity given by the joint release of the in-
volved elements), or could have it derived based on
the difference between the overall sensitivity she per-
ceives for the association and the sensitivity of the in-
dividual properties and/or credentials involved. For in-
stance, with reference to the portfolio in Figure 2, as-
sume that λ(Name)=1 and λ(myDialysis)=15. If the sen-
sitivity associated with the combined release of Name
and myDialysis is equal to 50, the sensitivity label
of the association λ({Name,myDialysis}) is therefore
50−λ(Name)−λ(myDialysis) = 34.
5.4 Disclosure constraints
In addition to specifying the sensitivity labels of creden-
tials, properties, and associations in the portfolio, the
user may want to specify additional constraints that can-
not be simply expressed with a sensitivity label. Some
associations of the portfolio elements in fact might be
not only much more sensitive than the combination of
the labels of the elements, but should be definitely pro-
hibited by the user, meaning that the user never wants
to release some information in association. We accom-
modate this requirement by allowing the specification of
Properties
λ(Name) : 1
λ(DoB) : 3
λ(SSN) : 10
λ(Country) : 2
λ(BloodType) : 4
λ(Phone) : 7
λ(myVISA.CCNum) : 10
λ(myAMEX .CCNum) : 15
λ(NickName) : 1
Credentials
λ(myId) : 1
λ(myTaxId) : 1
λ(myPassport) : 2
λ(myDialysis) : 15
λ(myVISA) : 5
λ(myAMEX ) : 8
λ(decl) : 0
Sensitive views
λ({Name,myVISA.CCNum,myAMEX .CCNum}) : 10
λ({Name,myDialysis}) : 34
Dependencies
λ({Phone, Country}) : -2
Disclosure constraints
{Name,NickName}
Figure 4 Sensitivity specification for the portfolio in
Figure 2
disclosure constraints as a set of properties and/or cre-
dentials that should never be released together. For in-
stance, a user might have in her portfolio both a Name
and a NickName, each one with a sensitivity label (to
be considered when the element is released), but their
association should never be disclosed.
Example 5.1 Figure 4 illustrates an example of a la-
beling function λ for the portfolio illustrated in Fig-
ure 2. The figure also reports two sensitive views
{Name,myVISA.CCNum,myAMEX.CCNum}, since the com-
bined release of the specified elements could permit a
server to link different credit cards to the same user,
and {Name, myDialysis}, since the combined release of
the specified elements could result in unauthorized in-
ference on sensitive medical information; one depen-
dency {Phone, Country}, since the knowledge of the
phone number also discloses the country; and one dis-
closure constraint {Name,NickName}, since the user does
not want to release both her name and her nickname.
6 Context restrictions
A user may want to specify which properties/credentials
in the portfolio can be disclosed, on the basis of the do-
main of both the server and the information in the port-
folio. For instance, a user may want to release her dialysis
certificate to a hospital, while forbidding its disclosure to
a pharmaceutical company. The user should then define
as many views on her portfolio as the number of servers
she interacts with. However, this practice is complex and
difficult to manage for a user, who can easily lose con-
trol, since the number of servers in the system could be
huge. Intuitively, users may classify servers in categories
(e.g., government, medical) that reflect their functional
and/or competence areas. All the servers in a category
enjoy the same view on the client portfolio. Even when
interacting with servers in the same category, users may
want to further restrict access to their data depending
on the transaction executed (e.g., payment, reservation,
diagnosis consult). As an example, the user may restrict
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Figure 5 An example of hierarchy of categories
the release of her credit card to financial servers in the
context of payment transactions only.
6.1 Categories and transactions
Each property, credential, and association in the client
portfolio is labeled with a set of context restrictions con-
sisting of a category and a set of transactions, defined as
follows.
• Categories (Γ): define the functional, or compe-
tence, areas of both servers and portfolio elements.
Categories implicitly determine the set of servers
who can access a given property/credential in the
client portfolio (i.e., the servers whose category
is more specific than the one of the information).
Each user defines her own set of categories, based
on her privacy requirements, modeling different
groups of servers in the system. We assume, the
set Γ of categories defined by the user to be or-
ganized in a hierarchy HΓ(Γ,!Γ), where !Γ is a
partial order relationship defined over Γ. Given two
categories γi and γj in Γ, we say that γi domi-
nates γj , denoted γi!Γγj , if γi represents a cat-
egory broader than γj . We use ∗ to denote the
top category in the hierarchy; ∗ represents all the
categories defined by the user. For instance, Fig-
ure 5 illustrates an example of hierarchy of cate-
gories, where category Financial is broader than
category Insurance, Bank , and Admin (i.e., Fi-
nancial!ΓInsurance, Financial!ΓBank , and Fi-
nancial!ΓAdmin). We note that our model can
support user-specific categories that refer to one
server only (e.g., HospitalA, InsuranceCompanyB,
and BankC). Only the servers that belong to a cat-
egory that is dominated by the one of the prop-
erty/credential can access it.
• Transactions (K): define the set of interactions
where a property, credential, or association can be
released. For instance, if the client interacts with a
server to make a flight reservation, the transaction
can be labeled as reservation and payment . As an-
other example, if the client interacts with the same
server to access flight information, the transaction
can be labeled as browsing . As for categories, each
user defines her own unordered set of transactions
K. Notation ∗ is used to represent the set of all
transactions.
Formally, a context restriction ctx∈Γ× 2K is defined
as a pair 〈γ,{k1,. . . ,kn}〉, where γ∈Γ is a category, and
{k1,. . . ,kn}⊆K is a set of transactions. We define a dom-
inance relationship between pairs of sets of context re-
strictions. A set Ctx i of context restrictions dominates
a set Ctx j of context restrictions if, for each context
restriction ctx j in Ctx j , there exists at least a context
restriction ctx i in Ctx i such that the category in ctx i
dominates the category in ctx j and the set of transac-
tions in ctx i is a superset of the one in ctx j . Formally,
this dominance relationship can be defined as follows.
Definition 6.1 (Dominance) Let Γ be a set of cat-
egories with partial order relationship !Γ, K be a
set of transactions, Ctx i and Ctx j be two sets of
context restrictions. Ctx i dominates Ctx j, denoted
Ctx i!ctxCtx j, iff ∀ctx j=〈γj,{kj,1,. . . ,kj,n}〉∈Ctx j,
∃ctx i=〈γi,{ki,1,. . . ,ki,m}〉∈Ctx i =⇒ γi!Γγj and
{ki,1,. . . ,ki,m}⊇{kj,1,. . . ,kj,n}.
Two sets of context restrictions Ctx i and Ctx j are
said to be incomparable iff neither Ctx i!ctxCtx j nor
Ctx j!ctxCtx i.
Example 6.1 Consider two sets of context restric-
tions Ctx i = {〈Government,{payment,services}〉,
〈Financial,{payment,services}〉},
Ctx j={〈Bank,{payment}〉}. Ctx i dominates
Ctx j since, for the unique context restriction
〈Bank,{payment}〉 in Ctx j, there exists a context restric-
tion 〈Financial,{payment,services}〉 in Ctx i such that
Financial!ΓBank and {payment,services}⊇{payment}.
We introduce a labeling function
φ : C ∪ P ∪A → 2Γ×2K that associates with
each property, credential, and association in
the client portfolio a set Ctx={ctx1,. . . ,ctxn}
of context restrictions. As an example,
φ(myTaxId) = {〈Government ,{payment ,services}〉,
〈Financial ,{payment ,services}〉}. Note that the set
of context restrictions of atomic credentials and as-
sociations should be coherent with the set of context
restrictions of their elements. In particular, the set of
context restrictions associated with an atomic credential
should be dominated by the set of context restric-
tions associated with each of the properties it certifies.
Formally, given an atomic credential c and the set of
properties {p1,. . . ,pn} it certifies, ∀pi∈{p1,. . . ,pn},
φ(pi)!ctxφ(c), meaning that all the properties certified
by c will be relevant at least for the same set of context
restrictions as c . On the contrary, since a property can
also be declared, its set of context restrictions can also
be larger than the one of the atomic credential certifying
it. Similarly, the joint release of properties and creden-
tials composing an association is permitted only within
the context restrictions defined for the association. For-
mally, given an association A, ∀el∈A, φ(el)!ctxφ(A),
meaning that all the properties and credentials that be-
long to A must be labeled with at least the same set of
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context restrictions as A. The declaration decl is always
associated with φ(decl)={〈∗,∗〉}, which dominates any
possible set of context restrictions.
Finally, the client classifies each request from the
server with a context restriction φ(R)={〈γ,{k}〉}, where
γ∈Γ is the category associated with the requesting server
and k∈K is the transaction. We note that each request
is associated with exactly one category and one transac-
tion. Also, for each simple request r in R, φ(r )=φ(R).
A server request R can be satisfied only by releasing
properties and credentials that are relevant for R, that
is, whose set of context restrictions dominate φ(R). In-
tuitively, the context restriction of a request R induces
a view over the portfolio graph, which includes proper-
ties, credentials, and associations that can be possibly
released to satisfy R.
7 Extended portfolio graph
Our graph modeling of the client portfolio can easily
be extended to represent sensitivity labels, associa-
tions, disclosure constraints, and context restrictions.
We add a vertex for each association and each disclo-
sure constraint and an edge connecting each association
and disclosure constraint with the involved properties
and/or credentials. We then define a labeling function
$ that assigns to each vertex in the portfolio graph
representing a property, a credential, or an association
both a sensitivity label and a set of context restric-
tions. The labeling function $ is therefore defined as
the composition of labeling functions λ and φ, which
associate a sensitivity label and a set of context restric-
tions, respectively, with each property, credential, and
association in the portfolio. The label $ of an element
el in the portfolio (i.e., a property p , a credential c ,
or an association A) is of the form [λ(el),φ(el)], where
λ(el) is the sensitivity label of the property and φ(el)
is a set of context restrictions. As an example, labeling
$(myVISA)=[15,{〈Financial,{payment,reservation}〉}]
means that credential myVISA has sensitivity label
equal to 15 and can be released only in the context of
payment or reservation transactions to servers in the
Financial category. Formally, the definition of portfolio
graph (Definition 3.1) is extended as follows.
Definition 7.1 (Portfolio Graph – Extended)
Let G(VC∪VP ,EC) be a portfolio graph, A and
L be a set of associations and disclosure con-
straints over P∪C, respectively. A portfolio graph
extended by associations and disclosure constraints
G(VC∪VP∪VA∪VL,EC∪EA∪EL,$) is a labeled graph,
having an additional vertex for each association in A
and each disclosure constraint in L, and an additional
edge connecting each association and disclosure con-
straint to the properties and credentials contained in
it. The labeling function $ assigns a label $(v ) to each
vertex v∈(VC∪VP∪VA), corresponding to [λ(v ),φ(v )].
Our definition of labeling function $ assumes that
each credential, property, and association has a single
sensitivity label that is independent from its context re-
strictions. Basically, sensitivity labels model how much
the client values the release of her information and this
evaluation is not related to the domain of the informa-
tion itself. The definition of $ as the composition of λ
and φ functions provides high flexibility and modular-
ity. In fact, a client can choose to adopt sensitivity labels
only, context restrictions only, or their combination. We
note that our model can be simply extended to permit
the client to define different sensitivity labels (one for
each context restriction) for the same property, creden-
tial, and association. In this case, it is necessary to refer
to traditional conflict resolution policies to manage in-
consistencies among multiple sensitivity labels that may
apply to the same server request [15].
Example 7.1 Consider the portfolio graph in Figure 2,
the sensitivity labels, associations, and disclosure con-
straints in Figure 4, and the hierarchy of categories in
Figure 5. Figure 6 illustrates an example of an extended
portfolio graph. For simplicity, sensitivity labels are in-
dicated next to the vertices, while the complete labeling
function $ of the graph, including also context restric-
tions, is reported in Figure 6(b).
8 Disclosure modeling
A disclosure represents a subset of the client portfolio,
which is communicated to the server for satisfying a re-
quest R. A disclosure can be modeled as a subgraph of
the portfolio graph, called disclosure graph. Intuitively,
this subgraph includes all the vertices and edges corre-
sponding to credentials, properties, and associations that
are exposed by the disclosure, and disclosure constraints
that are violated by it. Note that the disclosure to the
server of a subset of the properties in the portfolio must
also imply the release of a set of credentials (or a dec-
laration) certifying them, additional properties included
in atomic credentials, and sensitive associations. While
each disclosure is a subgraph, the vice versa is not neces-
sarily true (i.e., not all subgraphs represent a disclosure).
As a matter of fact, a subgraph of the portfolio graph
can be considered a disclosure graph only if it correctly
represents a possible release of information. In particu-
lar, in a disclosure: 1) each disclosed property must be
certified by (at least) a credential, that is, credential ex-
istence is also disclosed (certifiability); 2) if a property
of an atomic credential is disclosed, all its properties are
disclosed (atomicity); 3) if all properties and credentials
forming a sensitive association are disclosed, the sensi-
tive association must be considered disclosed (associa-
tion exposure); 4) if all properties and credentials form-
ing a disclosure constraint are disclosed, the disclosure
constraint must be considered violated (constraint vio-
lation). These properties are captured by the following
definition of disclosure graph.
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(a)
Properties
"(Name): [1, 〈∗,∗〉]
"(DoB): [3, 〈∗,∗〉]
"(SSN): [10, 〈Government,{payment,services}〉,
〈Financial,{payment,services}〉,
〈Medical,{treatment,diagnosis}〉,
〈InsuranceCompanyA,{services}〉]
"(Country): [2, 〈∗,∗〉]
"(BloodType): [4, 〈Medical,{treatment,diagnosis}〉,
〈InsuranceCompanyA,{services}〉]
"(Phone): [7, 〈∗,∗〉]
"(myVISA.CCNum): [10, 〈∗,{payment}〉, 〈BankC ,∗〉]
"(myAMEX.CCNum): [15, 〈∗,{payment}〉, 〈BankC ,∗〉]
"(NickName): [1, 〈∗,∗〉]
Credentials
"(myId): [1, 〈∗,∗〉]
"(myTaxId): [1, 〈Government,{payment,services}〉,
〈Financial,{payment,services}〉]
"(myPassport): [2, 〈∗,∗〉]
"(myDialysis): [15, 〈Medical,{treatment,diagnosis}〉,
〈InsuranceCompanyA,{services}〉]
"(myVISA): [5, 〈∗,{payment}〉, 〈BankC ,∗〉]
"(myAMEX ): [8, 〈∗,{payment}〉, 〈BankC ,∗〉]
"(decl): [0, 〈∗,∗〉]
Sensitive views
"({Name,myVISA.CCNum,myAMEX.CCNum}): [10, 〈BankC ,∗〉]
"({Name,myDialysis}): [34, 〈HospitalA,{treatment,diagnosis}〉]
Dependencies
"({Phone,Country}): [−2, 〈∗,∗〉]
(b)
Figure 6 Portfolio graph in Figure 2 extended with the sensitivity specifications in Figure 4 and context restrictions
Definition 8.1 (Disclosure Graph) Let
G(VC∪VP∪VA∪VL,EC∪EA∪EL,$) be a portfolio graph.
A subgraph Gd(V dC∪V dP∪V dA∪V dL,EdC∪EdA∪EdL,$) of G
where V dC⊆VC , V dP⊆VP , V dA⊆VA, V dL⊆VL, EdC⊆EC ,
EdA⊆EA, and EdL⊆EL is a disclosure graph iff the
following properties hold:
1. vp∈V dP =⇒ ∃ vc∈V dC s.t. (vc,vp)∈EdC ;
2. vc∈V dC s.t. credential vc is atomic =⇒ ∀vp∈VP :
(vc,vp)∈EC , vp∈V dP and (vc,vp)∈EdC ;
3. va∈VA s.t. ∀(va,v )∈EA, v∈V dP∪V dC =⇒ va∈V dA
and (va,v )∈EdA;
4. v l∈VL s.t. ∀(v l,v )∈EL, v∈V dP∪V dC =⇒ v l∈V dL
and (v l,v )∈EdL.
Condition 1 states that if a property vertex belongs to
the disclosure graph, then at least one of its adjacent cre-
dential vertices belongs to the graph. Condition 2 states
that if a credential vertex representing an atomic creden-
tial belongs to the disclosure graph, then all the vertices
representing its properties, and the edges modeling the
containment relationship of the properties in the atomic
credential also belong to the graph. Condition 3 (4, resp.)
states that if all the vertices representing the proper-
ties and credentials composing an association (disclosure
constraint, resp.) belong to the disclosure graph, then
also the vertex representing the association (disclosure
constraint, resp.) and the edges between the association
(disclosure constraint, resp.) and the involved properties
and credentials belong to the graph.
We note that not all the disclosures can be communi-
cated to the server, since context restrictions and disclo-
sure constraints limit their release. A disclosure is legiti-
mate with respect to a set of context restrictions Ctx if:
i) it includes only vertices characterized by context re-
strictions that dominate Ctx , and ii) it does not violate
any disclosure constraint. Formally, a legitimate disclo-
sure is defined as follows.
Definition 8.2 (Legitimate Disclosure Graph)
Let Gd(V dC∪V dP∪V dA∪V dL,EdC∪EdA∪EdL,$) be a disclo-
sure graph and Ctx a set of context restrictions. Gd is
a legitimate disclosure graph w.r.t. Ctx iff:
• ∀v∈(V dC∪V dP∪V dA), φ(v )!ctxCtx ;
• V dL=∅.
We note that only legitimate disclosures w.r.t. a
set of context restrictions Ctx can be released to sat-
isfy a request characterized by these disclosure restric-
tions. The sensitivity of a disclosure can be computed
by composing the sensitivity labels of the vertices in
the corresponding disclosure graph. Given a disclosure
graph Gd(V dC∪V dP∪V dA∪V dL,EdC∪EdA∪EdL,$), the sensi-
tivity λ(Gd) of the disclosure graph is λ(Gd) =
∑
v λ(v ),
with v in V dC∪V dP∪V dA.
Example 8.1 Figure 7 represents an example of a le-
gitimate disclosure graph Gd w.r.t. context restrictions
Ctx={〈Medical,{payment}〉} for the portfolio graph in
Figure 6. In the figure, the vertices and edges in
the portfolio graph that also belong to the disclo-
sure graph are represented with a bold black line, the
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(a)
Properties
"(Name): [1, 〈∗,∗〉]
"(DoB): [3, 〈∗,∗〉]
"(SSN): [10, 〈Government,{payment,services}〉,
〈Financial,{payment,services}〉,
〈Medical,{treatment,diagnosis}〉,
〈InsuranceCompanyA,{services}〉]
"(Country): [2, 〈∗,∗〉]
"(BloodType): [4, 〈Medical,{treatment,diagnosis}〉,
〈InsuranceCompanyA,{services}〉]
"(Phone): [7, 〈∗,∗〉]
"(myVISA.CCNum): [10, 〈∗,{payment}〉, 〈BankC ,∗〉]
"(myAMEX.CCNum): [15, 〈∗,{payment}〉, 〈BankC ,∗〉]
"(NickName): [1, 〈∗,∗〉]
Credentials
"(myId): [1, 〈∗,∗〉]
"(myTaxId): [1, 〈Government,{payment,services}〉,
〈Financial,{payment,services}〉]
"(myPassport): [2, 〈∗,∗〉]
"(myDialysis): [15, 〈Medical,{treatment,diagnosis}〉,
〈InsuranceCompanyA,{services}〉]
"(myVISA): [5, 〈∗,{payment}〉, 〈BankC ,∗〉]
"(myAMEX ): [8, 〈∗,{payment}〉, 〈BankC ,∗〉]
"(decl): [0, 〈∗,∗〉]
Sensitive views
"({Name,myVISA.CCNum,myAMEX.CCNum}): [10, 〈BankC ,∗〉]
"({Name,myDialysis}): [34, 〈HospitalA,{treatment,diagnosis}〉]
Dependencies
"({Phone,Country}): [−2, 〈∗,∗〉]
(b)
Figure 7 An example of a legitimate disclosure graph w.r.t. Ctx={〈Medical,{payment}〉} over the portfolio in Figure 6
vertices and edges that are relevant for Ctx (i.e.,
such that φ(v )!ctxCtx ) are represented with a dashed
black line, all the other vertices and edges are rep-
resented with a dotted light gray line. The sensitiv-
ity of the disclosure λ(Gd) is computed as the com-
position of the sensitivity labels of bold vertices, that
is, λ(Name) + λ(DoB) + λ(Country) + λ(Phone) +
λ(myVISA.CCNum) + λ(myId) + λ(myVISA) + λ(decl)
+ λ({Country,Phone}) = 27.
Intuitively, a request R is satisfied by a legitimate
disclosure w.r.t. φ(R) if at least one of the simple re-
quests r in R is satisfied. A simple request r is satisfied
by a legitimate disclosure w.r.t. φ(R) that includes, for
each term type.{p1,. . . ,pm} in r , a credential c certify-
ing {p1,. . . ,pm} such that type!T type(c). Graphically,
a legitimate disclosure w.r.t. φ(R), represented by a dis-
closure graph Gd, satisfies a simple request, represented
by a request graph Gr , if there exists a subgraph in Gd
that is isomorphic to Gr , as formalized by the following
definition.
Definition 8.3 (Satisfying Disclosure) Let r
be a simple request, φ(r ) its context restriction,
Gr (V rT∪V rP ,E rT ) the corresponding request graph,
and Gd a legitimate disclosure graph w.r.t. φ(r )
(Definition 8.2). Gd satisfies Gr , denoted Gd|=Gr , iff
there exists a subgraph Gd
′
(V d
′
C∪V d
′
P ,E
d′
C ) of G
d and
an isomorphism f :V rT∪V rP→V d
′
C∪V d
′
P , such that the
following conditions hold:
1. ∀v t∈V rT , ∃f(v t)∈V d
′
C ∧ v t!T type(f(v t));
2. ∀vp∈V rP , ∃f(vp)∈V d
′
P ∧ vp=f(vp);
3. ∀(v t,vp)∈E rT , (f(v t),f(vp))∈Ed
′
C .
Condition 1 states that each vertex v t in the request
graph, representing a type in a term of the request,
should have a corresponding vertex f(v t) in the disclo-
sure graph, such that v t is an abstraction of type(f(v t)).
Condition 2 states that each vertex vp in the request
graph, representing a property within a term, should
have a corresponding vertex f(vp) in the disclosure
graph. Condition 3 states that each edge in the request
graph should have a corresponding edge in the disclosure
graph.
Note that the request graph Gr could represent an
isomorphic proper subgraph of a satisfying disclosure
graph Gd, since Gd possibly includes atomic credentials
and associations. The additional vertices in Gd represent
additional information that is not needed for a success-
ful access, but whose removal from Gd would result in
a subgraph of G that does not represent a legitimate
disclosure w.r.t. φ(R) (Definitions 8.1 and 8.2).
A request R, represented by a set Gr1 ,. . . ,Gri of re-
quest graphs, is satisfied by a legitimate disclosure graph
Gd w.r.t. φ(R), if Gd satisfies at least one of the request
graphs (i.e., ∃Grj , j = 1, . . . , i, such that Gd|=Grj ).
Example 8.2 Consider the disclosure graph Gd in Fig-
ure 7 and the request graphs Gr1 and Gr2 in Figure 3. It
is easy to see that Gd|=Gr1 , since Gr1 is isomorphic to
a subgraph of Gd. We have instead that Gd 5|=Gr2 since
the disclosure of one credential of type cc cannot satisfy
both the terms with type=cc in Gr2 .
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Among all legitimate disclosure graphs w.r.t. φ(R)
that satisfy the server request, the client is interested in
the one that minimizes the disclosure of information. To
this purpose, it is first necessary to guarantee that the
disclosure graph is minimal with respect to the request
(i.e., removing any of its vertices, the disclosure either
does not satisfy the request or the sensitivity label of the
disclosure increases). In other words, a disclosure graph
Gd is minimal if there does not exist any disclosure graph
Gd
′
, subgraph of Gd, that satisfies the request with lower
sensitivity.
Definition 8.4 (Minimal Disclosure) Let G be a
portfolio graph and R be a request. A disclosure graph
Gd(V dC∪V dP∪V dA∪V dL,EdC∪EdA∪EdL,$) is a minimal dis-
closure w.r.t. R iff:
• Gd satisfies R (∃r in R such that Gd|=Gr , Defi-
nition 8.3);
• ! a disclosure graph Gd′ of G such that Gd′
satisfies R; V d′C∪V d
′
P ∪V d
′
A ⊂ V dC∪V dP∪V dA; and
λ(Gd
′
)<λ(Gd).
The problem of computing a disclosure graph that
satisfies a request and minimizes the sensitivity label can
be formally defined as follows.
Problem 8.1 (Min-Disclosure) Given a portfolio
graph G and a request R, find a minimum disclosure
graph Gd(V dC∪V dP∪V dA∪V dL,EdC∪EdA∪EdL,λ) of G
w.r.t. R that satisfies the following requirements:
• Gd satisfies R (∃r in R such that Gd|=Gr , Defi-
nition 8.3);
• ! a disclosure graph Gd′ of G such that Gd′ satis-
fies R and λ(Gd′)<λ(Gd).
We note that any minimum disclosure graph is also a
minimal disclosure graph, while the contrary is not true.
Example 8.3 With reference to the request graph Gr1
in Figure 3(a), the disclosure graph Gd in Figure 7 repre-
sents a minimal disclosure for Gr1 . In fact, the removal
of any vertex v in V dC∪V dP∪V dA would produce a sub-
graph Gd
′
that either violates at least a condition in Def-
inition 8.1, or does not satisfy Gr1 . However, Gd is not
a minimum disclosure. We note that the first term in r1,
that is, id.{Name,Country}, can be satisfied by disclos-
ing either myId or myPassport. The release of myId dis-
closes an additional property (i.e., DoB). The disclosure
of (non-atomic) credential myPassport does not require
the release of property DoB, which incurs in additional
cost, and is therefore preferred.
The Min-Disclosure problem is NP-hard, as stated by
the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The Min-Disclosure problem is NP-hard.
Proof: The proof is a reduction from the NP-hard prob-
lem of the Minimum Set Cover, formulated as follows:
given a collection S of subsets of a finite set U , determine
a subset S′ ⊆ S such that every element in U belongs to
at least one member of S′, and the cardinality of S′ is
minimized.
Given the set P of properties, the set C of credentials, and
the set A of associations composing the client portfolio,
and a request R, the correspondence between the Min-
Disclosure problem and the minimum set cover problem
can be defined as follows. The set P of properties includes
a property for each element in U , a property s_id for
each s ∈ S, and a property p0. Properties in U∪{p0} are
credential independent, while properties s_id are cre-
dential dependent. The set C of credentials is defined as
the set S of subsets of elements in U . Specifically, cre-
dential c representing a subset s certifies the properties
composing s and property s_id. The set C of creden-
tials also includes an additional credential of type prb
that certifies property p0. All the credentials in C are
atomic. The set A of associations is composed of a sin-
gle dependency A=U∪{p0}. The sensitivity label of all
the properties and credentials in the portfolio, but p0, is
equal to zero, λ(p0)=1 and λ(A)=−1. Let us now con-
sider request R1=prb.p0∧∗.s_id. If the disclosure D has
sensitivity label equal to 0, then it represents a solution
S′ for the corresponding minimum set cover problem,
where the disclosed credential is the unique set cover-
ing U . If the disclosure D has sensitivity label equal to
1, we consider a new request R2=prb.p0∧∗.s_id∧∗.s_id
that tries to find a set cover composed of two subsets in
S. The number of terms in the request is iteratively in-
creased by one until a solution to the problem is found or
the number of terms in the request is equal to |S| = |C|.
Hence, the Min-Disclosure problem is NP-hard. !
9 Communication state management
In the previous discussion, we focused on minimizing the
information released by the client in response to a request
from a server. However, Web-based information systems
typically support a navigational access to resources. For
instance, a client, guided by a Web interface, can browse
a catalog and then possibly buy an item within it. The
client might then be requested to release first some infor-
mation (credentials/properties) for accessing and brows-
ing the catalog, and then further information for com-
pleting the purchase. In such a case, it is important for
the client to maintain track of the communication state
(i.e., information already disclosed to the server) within
a generic time/operation window set by the client for
two main purposes: i) to minimize the amount of infor-
mation released overall; or ii) to prevent the server from
linking different accesses to the same client (i.e., prevent
linkability). In the following, we will discuss how these
requirements can be managed by our graph-based model.
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9.1 Minimizing disclosure
When the client-server interaction is characterized by a
sequence of requests for data by the server, the client may
want to ensure minimality of the information released
overall, rather than the specific information released at
each server request within a generic time/operation win-
dow. As an example, consider a Web-based reservation
system, where the client first books a flight and then
rents a car. When completing the car reservation, the
client might want to take into consideration the informa-
tion already disclosed to the server for the flight reserva-
tion, to minimize the information released overall. There-
fore, if the server requires a credit card or an id docu-
ment, the client might want to stick with the one just
released. The information already disclosed by the client
has also to be taken into consideration to ensure the dis-
closure constraints are not violated. For instance, with
reference to the sensitivity specification Example 5.1,
suppose a client discloses its NickName to the server. By
providing stateful capability, the subsequent release of
Name will be prohibited, since otherwise the disclosure
constraint would be violated.
Our graph-based modeling of the client portfolio al-
lows to address the issues above, providing the ability of
maintaining the communication state of the client with
the server (i.e., the set of properties and credentials al-
ready released). Each time window is characterized by a
unique disclosure graph that is possibly updated at each
request by including additional properties/credentials.
The disclosure graph of a time window must satisfy all
the requests, while minimizing for each request the addi-
tional information released with respect to the commu-
nication state. Given a request, if the disclosure graph
modeling the communication state satisfies it, the client
does not need to release additional information; other-
wise, the disclosure graph is extended to include other
properties/credentials in the portfolio. In such a way, we
capture properties and credentials previously disclosed
and therefore they are taken into consideration in the
calculation of the sensitivity label of the disclosure, as
well as in the evaluation of the disclosure constraints.
Example 9.1 Consider a Web-based medical sys-
tem, in category HospitalA, that permits to re-
serve and pay for an examination, and to con-
sult a diagnosis. Given the server request in Ex-
ample 4.1, disclosure D={myId.{Name,DoB,Country},
myVISA.{Name,CCNum}, decl.Phone} in Example 8.1 per-
mits the user to reserve and pay for her examination. As
soon as the user tries to consult a diagnosis, the server is-
sues request R′=id.{Name}. This request can be satisfied
by disclosing either D1=myId.{Name,DoB,Country} or
D2=myPassport.{Name}. If we do not consider the com-
munication state, λ(D1)=7 and λ(D2)=1, and the client
discloses D2. On the contrary, if we consider the com-
munication state including the disclosure of D, λ(D1)=0,
since atomic credential myId has been already released in
D.
9.2 Preventing linkability
Web-based interactions usually assume clients and
servers to be unknown to each other. At each server re-
quest, the client discloses a subset of its portfolio that
could be exploited by the server to associate different
disclosures with the same client. As a consequence, be-
sides minimizing the amount of information disclosed at
each server request, the client may be interested in pre-
venting linkability. At each request, information released
within a time window needs to be considered, to ensure
that the same subset of properties/credentials is not dis-
closed more than once. For instance, consider an online
music store, where the user orders, with two subsequent
operations, two different songs that can be payed either
by credit card or with a gift card. For the purchase of
the first song, she releases her credit card, while for the
purchase of the second one, she discloses an anonymous
gift card, thus preventing linkability.
Since, as already discussed, our graph-based model-
ing of the client portfolio provides the ability of main-
taining the communication state of the client with the
server, it also allows the client to identify a satisfying
disclosure that minimizes the risk of linkability. To this
aim, given the communication state, the client needs to
compute a disclosure graph that both satisfies the cur-
rent request and minimizes its intersection with prop-
erties and credentials in the communication state. The
larger is the intersection among disclosures, the higher is
the linkability risk. Therefore, whenever a request can be
satisfied only by releasing a set of properties/credentials
that has an intersection with the communication state,
the client can decide to either proceed or terminate the
communication. For instance, if the intersection with the
communication state is represented by property Country
the client may decide to proceed, since many different
users live in the same country. On the contrary, if the in-
tersection with the communication state is represented
by property SSN the client may decide to terminate the
communication, since SSN is a unique identifier.
Example 9.2 Consider a Web-based medical sys-
tem, in category HospitalA, that permits to re-
serve two examinations. Given a server request
R=r1∨r2, with r1=(id.{Name,DoB} ∧ *.{Phone}) and
r2=(credential.{SSN} ∧ *.{NickName}), disclosure
D={myId.{Name,DoB,Country},decl.Phone} satisfies
r1 and permits the user to reserve her first exam-
ination. As soon as the user tries to reserve the
second examination, the server issues the same request
R. In this case the user wants to protect linkabil-
ity, and therefore minimize the intersection between
data released in different requests (still minimizing
the sensitivity label of each single release). R can be
satisfied by disclosing either the properties and cre-
dentials in the communication state (i.e., D), or one
between D1={myPassport.{Name,DoB},decl.Phone} and
D2={myDialysis.{SSN},decl.{NickName}}. If we do
not consider the communication state, since λ(D)=12,
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λ(D1)=13, and λ(D2)=26, the client discloses D. On
the contrary, if we consider the communication state
including the disclosure of D, D2 is released since
D∩D2=∅.
Note that the approach to prevent linkability is ap-
plicable also when different servers may exchange client
information. In this case, the client needs to maintain
a unique communication state for each domain, includ-
ing the information communicated to any server in the
domain itself.
10 Computing a minimal disclosure
Our solution models portfolios, requests, and disclosures
as graphs. Also, we use graph isomorphisms to check if a
disclosure graph Gd satisfies a given requestR, by check-
ing if at least one of the request graphs Gr representing
a simple requests in R is isomorphic to a subgraph of the
disclosure graph Gd. It seems then natural to consider
the problem of computing a minimal disclosure that sat-
isfies a request as a problem of graph matching. However,
our model has some peculiarities that cannot be simply
handled by off-the-shelf graph matching algorithms. For
instance, associations and disclosure constraints, which
are not defined in the request graph, need to be consid-
ered a posteriori when a satisfying disclosure is found.
Moreover, we also consider atomic credentials, meaning
that a request for a certified property in the request
graph can result in a credential disclosure that includes
more properties than the ones requested.
We then designed and implemented a heuristic al-
gorithm for computing a minimal disclosure that takes
into account all these aspects. Figure 8 illustrates the
pseudocode of our heuristics. It takes as input the port-
folio graph G and a server requestR=r1 ∨ . . . ∨ r i, char-
acterized by context restriction φ(R), and computes a
minimal disclosure graph Gd that satisfies R, if such a
disclosure exists.
The algorithm first removes from the portfolio graph
all the properties and credentials that cannot belong
to a disclosure that is legitimate w.r.t. φ(R), since
φ(v )5!ctxφ(R). Also, it removes from the portfolio graph
the associations and disclosure constraints including at
least one of the properties and/or credentials removed
from G , since these associations and constraints cannot
be violated by any legitimate disclosure. The associa-
tions that are characterized by context restrictions that
do not dominate φ(R) are instead transformed into dis-
closure constraints, since the joint release of the proper-
ties/credentials in the association must be forbidden in
the considered context. The algorithm assigns a sensitiv-
ity label equal to λ(G)+1 to each disclosure constraint
in G . In this way, disclosure constraints can be treated
by the algorithm in the same way as associations. If a
disclosure has sensitivity label greater than λ(G), it vio-
lates at least a disclosure constraint and is therefore not
legitimate.
INPUT
R=r1 ∨ . . . ∨ ri: server request
φ(R): context restriction of the request
G(VC∪VP∪VA∪VL,EC∪EA∪EL,"): extended portfolio graph
OUTPUT
Gd(V dC∪V dP∪V dA∪V dL,EdC∪EdA∪EdL,"): disclosure graph satisfying R
MAIN
/* Pre-filtering */
for each v∈(VC∪VP ) do
if φ(v )*+ctxφ(R) then
for each va∈VA : (vi,va)∈EA do
EA := EA \ {(vj ,va)∈EA:vj∈VC∪VP }
VA := VA \ {va}
for each v l∈VL : (vi,v l)∈EL do
EL := EL \ {(vj ,v l)∈EL:vj∈VC∪VP }
VL := VL \ {v l}
EC := EC \ {(v ,vi)∈EC :vi∈VC∪VP }
if v∈VC then VC := VC \ {v }
else VP := VP \ {v }
for each va∈VA do
if φ(va)*+ctxφ(R) then
EL := EL ∪ {(v ,va)∈EA:v∈VC∪VP }
EA := EA \ {(v ,va)∈EA:v∈VC∪VP }
VL := VL ∪ {va}
VA := VA \ {va}
/* model disclosure constraints as associations */
threshold := λ(G)+1
for each v∈VL do λ(v ) := threshold
/* Find a minimal disclosure */
Gd := ∅
for each ri∈R do
Gdi := Compute Disclosure(Gri ,G,threshold)
if Gdi *=∅ ∧ λ(Gdi )<λ(Gd) then Gd := Gdi
if Gd *=∅ then return(Gd)
else return(error)
COMPUTE DISCLOSURE(Gr ,G,threshold)
Gd := G
opt := Gd
while opt=Gd do
Gd := opt
for each v∈V dC do /* try to remove credentials */
Gd
′
:= Remove Cred(v ,Gd)
if Gd
′ |=Gr ∧ λ(opt)>λ(Gd′ ) then opt := Gd′
for each v∈V dP do /* try to remove properties */
Gd
′
:= Remove Prop(v ,Gd)
if Gd
′ |=Gr ∧ λ(opt)>λ(Gd′ ) then opt := Gd′
if λ(opt)>threshold then return(∅) /* the disclosure is not legitimate */
else return(opt)
REMOVE CRED(v ,Gd)
for each va∈V dA : (v ,va)∈EdA do /* remove associations */
EdA := E
d
A \ {(v ,va)}
V dA := V
d
A \ {va}
for each v l∈V dL : (v ,v l)∈EdL do /* remove constraints */
EdL := E
d
L \ {(v ,v l)}
V dL := V
d
L \ {v l}
for each vp∈V dP : (v ,vp)∈EdC do /* remove uncertified properties */
if ! vc∈V dC : vc *=v ∧ (vc,vp)∈EdC then
Remove Prop(vp,G
d)
/* remove the credential */
EdC := E
d
C \ {(vi,v )∈EdC :vi∈V dP }
V dC := V
d
C \ {v }
return(Gd)
REMOVE PROP(v ,Gd)
for each va∈V dA : (v ,va)∈EdA do
EdA := E
d
A \ {(v ,va)} /* remove associations */
V dA := V
d
A \ {va}
for each v l∈V dL : (v ,v l)∈EdL do
EdL := E
d
L \ {(v ,v l)} /* remove constraints */
V dL := V
d
L \ {v l}
for each (v ,vc)∈EdC s.t. vc is atomic do
Remove Cred(vc,G
d) /* remove atomic credentials certifying v */
/* remove the property */
EdC := E
d
C \ {(v ,vi)∈EdC :vi∈V dC}
V dP := V
d
P \ {v }
return(Gd)
Figure 8 Algorithm computing a minimal disclosure
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Figure 9 Execution time of the heuristic and the
exhaustive algorithms
For each simple request r i in R, the algo-
rithm computes the corresponding minimal disclosure
Gdi through function Compute Disclosure. Function
Compute Disclosure initializes the minimal disclosure
Gd for simple request r to G , which corresponds to
release all the credentials and properties in the port-
folio that are relevant for R. The function then iter-
atively evaluates the sensitivity label of the disclosure
graphs obtained by removing from Gd either a creden-
tial (function Remove Cred) or a property (function
Remove Prop). Among the graphs obtained, the al-
gorithm selects the one (opt) with minimum sensitivity
that satisfies r , which becomes the new disclosure graph
Gd. The process of reducing Gd by removing proper-
ties/credentials is repeated until a minimal disclosure is
found (i.e., until the removal of any property/credential
would result in a disclosure graph that does not satisfy
r or has a higher sensitivity label). If the computed min-
imal disclosure has sensitivity label greater than λ(G),
function Compute Disclosure returns an empty dis-
closure graph, otherwise it returns the computed mini-
mal disclosure, which is legitimate and satisfies the sim-
ple request r . Among all the (non empty) minimal disclo-
sures Gdi computed for the simple requests composing
R, the algorithm selects the one with lowest sensitivity
label, which is finally returned.
To assess the efficiency and effectiveness of our heuris-
tics, both in terms of the quality of the computed so-
lution and the execution time required for its compu-
tation, the algorithm has been implemented in C++.
To compare the solution obtained by the heuristics with
the optimum, we also implemented an exhaustive algo-
rithm solving the Min-Disclosure problem (Problem 8.1).
Experiments have been run on a PC with two Intel
Xeon Quad 2.0GHz L3-4MB, 12GB RAM, and a Linux
Ubuntu 9.04 operating system. A large variety of con-
figurations have been tested operating on several pa-
rameters: the number of atomic and non-atomic cre-
dentials, the number of properties, the structure of the
type/abstraction hierarchy, the number of sensitive as-
sociations, the number of disclosure constraints, and the
sensitivity of credentials, properties, and associations.
Overall, the heuristic algorithm was able to produce the
optimum in 88% of the cases, and when the optimum was
not identified, the distance from the optimum was on av-
erage 7.21% above the optimum. Figure 9 compares the
execution time of our heuristics with the execution time
of the exhaustive algorithm, considering an increasing
number of credentials (from 0 to 35) and 4 configurations
obtained by assuming 50%, 30%, 10%, and 0% of the
credentials to be non-atomic. As expected, the heuris-
tics was always able to produce an answer in less than
130ms, whereas the exhaustive algorithm requires expo-
nential time in the size of the portfolio, with a strong
dependence on the number of non-atomic credentials.
11 Related work
Research on credential-based access control [4, 5, 14, 17,
19] and trust negotiation [10, 12, 13, 16, 18, 21, 22] pri-
marily focused on server-side issues and proposed solu-
tions for controlling access to resources, specifying and
enforcing policies, and enabling negotiation. These solu-
tions typically assume to adopt a symmetric approach
at the client side, for regulating the release of user pri-
vate information and possibly manage negotiation with
the server. These approaches, however, do not allow the
client to determine which credentials and/or properties
to release to minimize the sensitive information commu-
nicated to the server. Also, they do not support emerging
technologies, such as SAML [1], OpenID [9], and anony-
mous credentials [6, 7]. In the literature, only few works
have addressed this issue. Chen et al. [8] propose a so-
lution that associates costs with credentials and poli-
cies to minimize the cost of a credential release within a
trust-negotiation protocol. Ka¨rger et al. [11] describe a
logic-based language for the specification of privacy pref-
erences dictating a partial order among the client prop-
erties. Both solutions provide some treatment of pref-
erences or scores associated with either credentials or
properties, but do not address the problem of model-
ing the client portfolio. Yao et al. [20] propose a point-
based trust management model, where the client labels
each credential in its portfolio with a quantitative pri-
vacy score, while the server defines a credit for each cre-
dential released by the client and a minimum threshold
of credits to access a resource. The proposed solution
finds an optimal set of client credentials, such that the
total privacy score of disclosed credentials is minimal
and the server access threshold is satisfied. Differently
from [20], our solution allows the client to define its pri-
vacy preferences and to minimize the disclosure of sen-
sitive information, independently from the server prefer-
ences. Also, our proposal provides a complete modeling
of the client portfolio, including both sensitivity of as-
sociations and disclosure constraints. Sensitivity labels
as a means for expressing privacy preferences on portfo-
lio components have been first proposed in [2, 3]. In [2],
we introduce a solution for protecting the privacy of the
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users based on sensitivity labels, a graph-based modeling
of the portfolio, and a heuristic approach to determine
a disclosure minimizing released information. The work
in [3] enhances the solution in [2] by supporting a richer
approach for the specification of sensitivity labels and
additional constraints. It also proposes a novel model-
ing of the problem exploiting its translation in terms of
a Weighted Max-SAT problem and its resolution via ex-
isting SAT solvers. This paper considerably extends the
works in [2, 3] by providing a revised graph modeling of
the portfolio that extends and complements sensitivity
labels with context restrictions. Also, it proposes an ap-
proach enabling the client to identify the information in
the portfolio relevant for a given request, based on the
competence area of the server and on the transaction.
Finally, it presents a solution that permits the client to
consider the communication state (i.e., previous releases
in a generic time window set by the user) when comput-
ing a satisfying disclosure that either minimizes the total
amount of released information or prevents linkability
among requests.
12 Conclusions
An important long-term goal of the evolution of ICT
technology is to combine the opportunities for the effi-
cient access, exchange, storage, and dissemination of in-
formation, with an adequate level of user control over her
own personal information. The approach presented in
the paper provides a concrete solution that improves the
support for the privacy requirements of the user when
interacting in open scenarios. We believe approaches of
this kind are going to be implemented in the Internet of
the future, leading to the construction of systems allow-
ing users to enjoy the benefits of emerging technology
while maintaining awareness and control over their pri-
vate information.
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